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2ABSTRACT
Individuals follow different rules for action: they react swiftly, grasping the short-
term advantages in sight; or they waste cognitive resources to complete otherwise easy
tasks, but are also able to plan ahead future complex decisions. Scholars from differ-
ent disciplines studied the conditions under which either decision rule may enhance
the fitness of its adopters, with a focus on the environmental features. However, we
here propose that a crucial feature of the evolution of populations and their decision
rules is rather inter-group interactions. Indeed, we study what happens when two
groups support different decision rules, encapsulated in narratives, and their popu-
lations interact with each other. In particular, we assume that the payoff of each
rule depends on the share of both social groups which adopts such rule. We then
describe the most salient dynamics scenarios and identify the conditions which lead
to chaotic dynamics and multistability regimes.
LEAD PARAGRAPH
The aim of this work is to investigate how the interaction of two so-
cial groups whose members carry different worldviews may affect their
adoption. In particular, we find that even if the members of the two so-
cial groups have institutions and norms favouring either one of the two
worldviews, here called narratives, they might adopt the other one due to
the interaction with members from the other group. We also study some
cyclic and chaotic dynamics, that is situations in which the narratives
in the social groups change at every new period or are otherwise very
sensitive to exogenous noise and initial conditions.
3I. INTRODUCTION
In recent debates of economic psychology and cognitive neuroscience, a well-known
position is the one called dualism [10]. This theory postulates the existence of two
parallel modes of cognitive functioning. On the one hand, there is the "experien-
tial", or "emotional" cognitive mode, otherwise simply labelled as "System 1". It
represents many non-rational decisional aspects, e.g. affective, intuitive, associative,
non-verbal, metaphorical, narrative, and so on. By contrast, there is the "analytical-
rational" side of cognition, also referred to as "System 2". It is based on conscious,
slow, effortful, reflective, deliberative processes based on a formal reasoning [13]. A
recurring thesis in the dualist literature suggests that these two types of problem
solving rules should not be misinterpreted as hierarchically ordered. In other words,
one is not better than the other and analytical cognition does not outperform the
experiential one, as the human behaviour is more than the result of the accumula-
tion of rules. Indeed, humans often rely on heuristics, which are simple decision rules
that discard part of the available information in order to limit the time employed to
take decisions and thus saving on cognitive resources [11, 12]. In this perspective,
System 1 heuristics are developed in order to increase the fitness with the surround-
ing environment and may thus be ecologically rational. This evolutionary argument
is supported by Slovic and Peters [19], who attribute the alternate luck of the two
cognitive modes to the historical and ecological setting of the human population. In
a prehistoric context, in which humans had to discern dangers from safe elements
in their environment, System 1 heuristics proved fundamental in providing quick
responses to basic needs. In later times, as humans started to live in ever more
complex and dense societies and their artefacts allowed them to exercise increased
control of the resources, System 2 thinking enhanced human potential. It is rel-
evant to underline that we employ narratives as the main conceptual tool for our
4theoretical framework because we consider narratives to function at a deeper level
of the human mind, identifying the meaningful causal links on which System 1 or
System 2 thinking may be applied. Whether an individual privileges one type of
thinking with respect to the other, she would still apply it to the same problem in
order to achieve the same goal. If System 1 and System 2 represent two different
ways to choose a Strategy in Risk! 1, a narrative is the available set of moves and
their expected consequences which altogether define the game to our eyes. Beside
this illustrative analogy, a narrative also carries with it the potential for creating a
social bond: seeing each other facing the same problem with the same set of possible
solutions lays the basis for our identification as a team [8].
The environment-bound evolution of cognition modes is also studied by Toupo et
al. [20], who model the evolution of two sub-populations: one composed of Emo-
tional minds (automatic agents, in their terminology) and the other by Cognitive
minds (controlled agents). In this article, the authors characterise the two types of
agents attributing short term advantages to the former and long term advantages to
the latter. They then proceed to study how the environmental conditions influence
the final composition of the overall population and classify the possible outcomes as
follows: convergence to a single strategy; co-existence represented by internal fixed
points; oscillation between one strategy and the other; bistability. In our work, sim-
ilarly to the work by Toupo et al. [20], cognitive and emotive minds may affect each
other's payoff. However, we also allow for two distinct social groups to exist, each
with a decision rule which is relatively advantageous to adopt. Moreover, the analyt-
ical framework we provide could be used to more generally study the juxtaposition
of two personal features or behavioural rules. Here we focus on narratives due to
the role that such concise messages have in delivering suggestive representations of
1 For anyone who is not familiar with Risk!, it is one of the most widespread board game, in which
players aim to reach indvidually specified objectives.
5the world which can effectively alter the behaviour of humans on the one hand and
construct a sense of shared identity on the other hand [7, 8]. Nonetheless, we do not
exclude that the dynamics of other conceptual couplets might be investigated with
the present model. In particular, our model could prove to be useful in studying
binary choices conditioned by negative externalities from other agents. Indeed, there
exist several contributions building on the seminal paper of Schelling [18], some of
whom presenting adoption processes that may give rise to chaotic dynamics (for in-
stance, see [3, 6]). However, these works assume that social interactions take place
among individuals belonging to the same population (that is, all individuals have the
same payoff structure). Our paper considers a context in which individuals are het-
erogeneous in terms of payoffs -two groups of individuals exist-, although they have
at disposal the same set of choices (two alternative narratives). In such a context,
we aim to show how the interplay between the adoption processes of choices in the
two groups may give rise to complex dynamics.
For the sake of simplicity, we identify the two groups as North and South, with no
reference intended to any real context. We thus assume that northerners are emotive
minds, whereas southerners are cognitive minds. In the terms of the works mentioned
so far, northerners are innate System 1 thinkers, whereas southerners mainly employ
System 2 processes. In the light of [7], we then assume that the individuals in our
model may also adopt different narratives, which are culturally dense representations
of the world, i.e. socially constructed and maintained beliefs on the causal links of
the world. We name the two alternative narratives cognitive and emotive as well, as
each of them resonates with its corresponding type of mind. We might think of the
Enlightenment, the Logical positivism, or the Rational choice as some of the most
important cognitive narratives in human history, as they all supported a rational
representation of the world. By contrast, the Romanticism, the Decadent movement
6or the Intuitionism, may be seen as instances of emotive narratives. In recent times,
an example of opposed emotive and cognitive narratives is provided by the clash of
post-truth and technocratic narratives, respectively. Indeed, we are witnesses of the
rise of so-called alternative facts and anti-establishment narratives on the one hand
and the scientification and de-politicisation of political issues on the other hand [15,
21]. They both offer clear, overly simplistic explanations of the world that can be
synthesized and proposed in concise messages: "The system robs us" vs. "There
is no alternative". Furthermore, this example also highlights that the causal links
embedded in a narrative do not need to be truthful in order to be adopted, as the
social and cultural component of a narrative could prove even more relevant to its
adopters, to the point that undermining the causal links of a narrative might prove
ineffective or even counterproductive [1]. This exemplification of opposed narratives
is not the subject of our study, but serves to show the relevance of the topic in
the public discourse. We shall thus concern with two generic emotive and cognitive
narrative, with no further characterisation to allow for the generalisation of our
results.
Since we are interested in studying the diffusion of narratives beyond the bound-
aries of the groups in which they are mostly accepted, we give to both cognitive and
emotive individuals the possibility to adopt either narrative, independently of what
type of mind they are. We find that even if the members of the two social groups
have institutions and norms favouring either one of the two worldviews, here called
narratives, they might adopt the other one due to the interaction with members from
the other group. Note that we drop the word "strategy" in this work to refer to the
adoption of either narrative, since individuals do not interact in strategic games nor
they form expectations on their payoffs on the basis of such one-to-one interactions.
Individuals are assumed to behave adaptively according to the features of the system
7they are embedded in and the externalities entailed in the behaviour of others. In
addition, we should highlight that we do not deal with migration, i.e. shifts from one
group to the other. Northerners may still decide to adopt a cognitive behaviour (e.g.
Strategy 2 in [20]), but their inner nature would remain emotive. Indeed, we here
disjoint the social group an individual belongs to from her narrative, so that a cog-
nitive mind may adopt an emotive narrative without turning into an emotive mind.
In the language of psychologists, each person has and ultimately maintains a certain
personality, but may adopt a different narrative in the course of her life. In the
longer term, a large diffusion of a cognitive narrative might even affect the personal-
ity traits of emotive minds. In the shorter term, the possibility to change narratives
throughout her lifetime allows an individual to interact with different personalities,
e.g. a cognitive mind interacting with an emotive one [17].
Let us think, as an example, to a meeting between a sculptor and an architect.
Although the former may be an emotive mind and the second a cognitive one, the two
may be able to adopt either narrative. In particular, they may attempt to converge
on a common narrative when they are jointly commissioned a work from a patron.
Whether it is better for their collaboration that they both maintain their narrative
or coordinate on either of the two depends on the specific nature of their collabo-
ration. It could be better for both of them to exploit their narrative divergences
or, for instance, the architect might find it more fruitful to abandon his views on
functionality, understanding they are constraining the aesthetic value of the work.
This behavioural adaptation does not come without a cost, though. For instance,
in the latter case the architect might have a harder time obtaining a commission for
a bridge, which likely requires a more cognitive perspective. We do not intend this
simplification of human types as a truthful description of the spectrum of features
that characterises the human beings, but we rather use this example to stylise some
8basic narrative dynamics exploiting its convenient limitations (e.g. the presence of
only two individuals makes for an easier categorisation). More in general, a cogni-
tive mind may have appeased her emotive-behaving peers by acting emotive herself,
but she may now annoy cognitive individuals she had no friction with beforehand.
Indeed, individuals may not adapt their narrative depending on the people they in-
teract with: once they adopt either narrative, they maintain it with any other agent
they encounter. This derives from the fact that a narrative is neither a strategy nor
an action, it is a description of the world which underlies the mind of an agent in
her every action. When they abandon their narrative to adopt a new one, they will
uphold it with anyone else. We characterise individuals by means of this "procedural
friction" because we are interested in decisional framings and rules that have deep
cultural or institutional roots in the personality of individuals, inhibiting frequent
context-related adaptations.
II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this work, individuals adopt the narrative which enhances their performance,
given the share of members of both their social group and of the other group who
adopt the same narrative. In other terms, individuals live adapting to the set of
values and norms that their home narrative represents. Successful interaction with
their community as a whole is also based on the extent to which they share such
narrative with others. Moreover, whichever narrative they decide to adopt, they
will carry with them the culture and norms it embeds also when interacting with
individuals from another social group, whose population might in turn be exposed
to this new set of values and practices. We can now see how every inter-group
interaction is an opportunity for individuals from both groups to consider adopting
a different narrative.
9Analytically, we can break down what is relevant to the payoff of a narrative
into three different parts: cultural and institutional environment; within-group ex-
ternalities; cross-group externalities or mixed meetings. The first part refers to how
advantageous it is for an individual to adopt a narrative that is embedded in the
culture and in the institutions of her social group. Northerners, for instance, may
have norms that arose to enhance the life of individuals with an emotive narrative,
and foster the transmission of beliefs sustaining it to new individuals (for a review on
social or cultural learning, see [16]). This part does not depend on how many adopt
the same narrative in either group at the current time. The second part represents
the influence that members of the same social group have on each other. On this
regard, we keep an open mind on whether individuals may prefer that their fellow
members adopt the same narrative or not. Indeed, we here investigate also scenarios
in which two members of the same group, e.g. two southerners, would prefer the
other to adopt different narratives. Finally, the third part concerns with the influ-
ence that members from the other social group have. For instance, a southerner
may benefit from the fact that both she and the population of the North have a
cognitive narrative, because she can coordinate more easily in her "mixed meetings",
i.e. her exchanges. By contrast, people from the North may negatively be influenced
by southerners who adopt their emotive narrative, for example because it leads to a
perceived loss in authenticity of the narrative. Also in this case, we do not impose
any structure to inter-group influence and investigate a variety of scenarios.
III. THE MODEL
As the payoffs for individuals vary depending on whether they are from the North
or the South and whether they adopt the cognitive or the emotive narrative, we derive
four different payoff functions corresponding to this combinations. As concerns the
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North, we have:
EN = a1 + b1x+ c1y (1a)
CN = a2 + b2x+ c2y (1b)
where EN and CN are the payoff functions for northerners adopting an emotive or
a cognitive narrative, respectively. The payoffs depend on variables x, which identi-
fies the share of northerners adopting the emotive narrative, and y, which identifies
the share of southerners adopting the cognitive narrative. To the right hand side of
the equations, we may see the three parts we hinted to beforehand: the cultural envi-
ronment; the within-group externalities; the cross-group externalities. In particular,
a1 and a2 represent the fixed effect of the cultural and institutional environment of
the North. Note that it affects differently individuals adopting different narratives.
The intermediate terms b1 and b2 measure the within-group externalities: the former
relates to the effect of other northerners adopting the emotive narrative and the latter
refers to the cognitive narrative. Both are weighted by the share x of individuals in
the North who adopt the emotive narrative, which we recall being the favoured one.
The last term of the equations represents the cross-group externalities, with c1 and
c2 measuring the effect of southerners adopting the cognitive narrative. Analogously,
we derive the payoff functions for individuals from the South:
ES = α1 + β1y + γ1x (2a)
CS = α2 + β2y + γ2x (2b)
where α, β and γ are the symmetrical equivalent of a, b, and c. Note that now
the share y of individuals adopting the emotive narrative in the South is used to
weigh within-group externalities whereas x weighs cross-groups externalities. We
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now proceed to compute the difference in the narrative payoffs for the individuals in
the North:
ΠN = EN − CN = a+ bx+ cy (3)
where a1 − a2 = a > 0 represents the cultural and institutional advantage that
emotive minds have in adopting an emotive narrative in the North. By contrast,
b1 − b2 = b and c1 − c2 = c have no determined sign to allow for the greatest
generality. We do the same for the payoffs of southerners:
ΠS = CS − ES = α + βy + γx (4)
with α2−α1 = α > 0 as southerners adopting the emotive narrative are relatively
at a disadvantage with respect to their peers adopting the cognitive narrative. Also
in this case, β2 − β1 = β and γ2 − γ1 = γ have no determined sign.
A. The diffusion of narratives
The payoffs of the two narratives are relevant to determine how they will diffuse in
the two social groups. Indeed, we build on the discrete choice framework described
by [4], who assume that the utility of every individual is random, with a noise
component that is iid and has an exponential distribution. In our work, the utility
of a generic individual i, at time t, is represented by the payoff functions described
in the previous paragraph plus a noise µi,t.
When considering an arbitrary large (infinite) number of individuals in the group,
the probability xt for each of them adopting the emotive narrative at time t converges
to the Gibbs probability of the multinomial logit model:
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xt =
eρEN,t−1
eρEN,t−1 + eρCN,t−1
(5)
where ρ measures the responsiveness of individuals in switching narratives. By
dividing by eρEN,t−1 , we can rewrite (5) to include the payoff difference ΠN :
xt =
1
1 + eρΠN,t−1
(6)
An analogous law drives the diffusion of narratives in the South:
yt =
1
1 + eρΠS,t−1
(7)
In order to simplify the analysis we have assumed an identical measure for the
responsiveness ρ of individuals belonging to both groups. This mechanism allows
individuals from both North and South to choose their narrative adaptively, i.e. ac-
cording to the payoffs they yield. However, it could be noted that in this formulation
swift changes in narrative adoption could occur, which would not seem realistic. In
order to better describe the phenomenon, we introduce an asynchronous updating
process, as in [9]. In this way, we allow for a friction (or memory) ε to make individ-
uals less eager to sudden narrative changes:
T :

x′ := εx+
1− ε
1 + e−ρ(a+bx+cy)
y′ := εy +
1− ε
1 + e−ρ(α+βy+γx)
(8)
where the map T is defined over the domain [0, 1] × [0, 1] and ′ is the unit-time
advance operator.
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IV. HOMOGENEOUS INTERACTIONS OR "ISOLATED GROUPS"
We now proceed to analyse the dynamics of narrative diffusion when inter-group
interactions do not occur or have otherwise no effect on the payoffs. In formal terms,
we set c = γ = 0, so that the term relating to mixed meetings for both southerners
and northerners is null. This allows us to study the dynamics of x and y separately,
focusing on the relevance of within-group externalities. On this regard, for the social
group of the North we find the following result.
Proposition 1: Let c = 0. The difference equation that describes the dynamics of
the group from the North in (8) admits a unique fixed point x∗ which lies in
(0, 1).
• If b > 0, x∗ is globally asymptotically stable;
• if ε = 0 and b < 0 the dynamics converges either to x∗ or to a 2-period
cycle around x∗;
• if ε > 0 and b < 0 chaotic dynamics may arise.
Proof: With straightforward calculation it is possible to verify that the map de-
scribing the x-dynamics has, at most, 2 stationary points and an inflection
point in the interval (0, 1). Considering the behaviour of the map at 0 and at
1, the result about the number of fixed points follows. Regarding the stability
properties, we can observe that if b > 0 the x-dynamics is described by an
increasing map, while if ε = 0 and b < 0 the map is decreasing.
Remark: Studying the values of ρ, it is possible to obtain further stability properties
of the fixed point. However, since we focus on the relevance of parameters a
and b we do not develop this point.
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FIG. 1: Monotonic dynamics for x.
All trajectories starting in the
interval [0, 1] converge to x∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Parameter values: a = 30, b = 4,
ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
FIG. 2: Case a > 0, b < 0. Dynamics
show damping oscillations around x∗.
Parameter values: a = 30, b = −32,
ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
This result shows that if the northerners adopting the emotive narrative receive
a positive externality from everyone else in the North who also adopts the emotive
narrative, then the x-dynamics will ultimately converge to the stationary equilib-
rium x∗. Such equilibrium x∗ will be very close to 1 if the payoffs of strategy EN
are sufficiently high with respect to those of strategy CN . This well depicts the fact
that individuals who adopt a narrative that is embedded in their culture and insti-
tutions would have no reason (save for errors) to change it if they also get positive
externalities by doing so. This case, characterised by sufficiently high values of a and
b, is represented in Fig. 12, where we can see that any initial condition would lead
the population of the North to a very high x. A negative within-group externality,
i.e. b < 0, may represent an "elitist" dynamics of narratives in the North, so that
2 Parameters values for this and the following figures were chosen in order to illustrate salient
dynamics phenomena from a mathematical or a theoretical point of view.
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an increasing share of the population adopting one narrative erodes the advantages
that the latter provides. In this perspective, individuals prefer to adopt either the
emotive or the cognitive narrative when they are least diffused within their social
group. Let us consider a couplet of narratives proposed by [7]: "Many hands make
light work" vs "It's every man by himself". In a society in which the former narrative
is most diffused, individuals will be highly collaborative and this will also be reflected
in supportive institutions. In this context, a self-focused narrative such as "it's ev-
ery man by himself" could lead an individual to relatively higher payoffs if it allows
her to benefit from a supportive environment although incurring into lower personal
costs for it. This is represented graphically in Fig. 2, where we can see that there is
still a fixed point x∗, although it lies to the left with respect to the previous case and
damping oscillations may be observed. If the negative externalities become stronger,
chaotic dynamics may arise, as shown in Fig. 3. The bifurcation diagram in Fig. 4
summarises the dynamics of x for varying values of b. For values of b lower than the
ones shown in the graph, we can observe alternating intervals of chaotic dynamics
and low-period cycles. We underline that Proposition 1 holds symmetrically also for
the South, where y and β substitute x and b, respectively.
As concerns the friction parameter ε, it is relevant to note that in this model
there can also be a destabilising effect on the dynamics of the system (see [22] for
a deeper analysis of the inertia). This means that if b < 0 and the dynamics is
attracted by a 2-period cycle for ε = 0, an increase in ε can induce cyclical dynamics
with longer period, and/or chaotic behaviour. Nonetheless, a value of ε close to 1
makes the stationary point stable. The reason is that the resistance to change, or
inertia, by part of the northerners causes a continuous miscoordination within the
North. In particular, if the values of a and b are not sufficiently high, the noise might
induce many northerners to choose the non-favoured narrative, generating nonlinear,
16
cyclical dynamics.
FIG. 3: Chaotic dynamics for x. In
this case the narrative dynamics
within groups does not reach a
stationary state. Indeed, large shares
of supporters for both narratives
coexist, with the share adopting each
narrative varying in time with an
apparently random pattern.
Parameter values: a = 30, b = −40,
ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
FIG. 4: Bifurcation diagram for b.
We note that if the (negative)
within-group externalities on payoff
are sufficiently strong, chaotic
dynamics may arise. Parameter
values: a = 30, ε = 0.47, ρ = 1, b
varies in the interval (−50, 0).
We now analyse narrative dynamics if the two social groups are interacting and
influencing each other. Formally, this translates into studying the cases in which
c 6= 0, γ 6= 0, or both.
V. UNIVOCAL INFLUENCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH
Let us now consider the case in which only one of the social groups, say, the
North, is influenced by the other group, whereas the South is indifferent to northern
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influences. Analytically, this is equivalent to assuming that γ = 0, so that the
narrative dynamics in the South is unchanged with respect to the previous section.
However, since c 6= 0, the dynamics of x in the North is influenced by how many of
the southerners decide to adopt either narrative.
We may assume that the North and the South are isolated at first (i.e. c =
γ = 0), and converging toward the fixed points x∗ and y∗, respectively, presented in
Proposition 1. If the North opens to influences from the South and c is positive, this
phenomenon favours the process of adoption of the emotive narrative. In this case the
system reaches a stationary state (x˜∗, y∗) with x˜∗ > x∗. Indeed, not only the emotive
northerners benefit from an institutional environment designed on their narrative,
but they are also advantaged by southerners adopting the cognitive narrative (the
preferred one in the South). From a dynamical point of view, we note that as y
converges to y∗, the asymptotic dynamics of x is described by the following map:
x′ := εx+
1− ε
1 + e−ρ(a+bx+cy∗)
(9)
In this case, we may derive the following results on the fixed points for the North
group.
Proposition 2: Let γ = 0 and y∗ be the attracting fixed point for y-dynamics. For
x-dynamics the following results hold:
• If b > 0 and either cy∗ + a > 0 or cy∗ + a < −b then a unique globally
asymptotically stable fixed point exists.
• If b > 0 and cy∗ + a ∈ (−b, 0) then one or three fixed points generally
exist (that is, excluding cases in which tangent points between the graph
of f and the 45-degree line exist). If three fixed points exists, the first
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and the third ones are locally asymptomatically stable, the second one is
unstable.
• If b < 0 then a unique fixed point exists which can be stable or unstable.
Proof: Notice that f(0) =
1− ε
1 + e−ρ(a+cy∗)
∈ (0, 1) and f(1) = ε+ 1− ε
1 + e−ρ(a+b+cy∗)
∈
(0, 1). This implies that the graph of f starts above the 45-degree line and
ends below it. Since f is continuous in [0, 1] it follows that at least one
fixed point exists and generally an overall odd number of fixed points ex-
ists. In order to study their multiplicity, we consider the first and the second
order derivatives of f which are f ′(x) = ε + (1−ε)ρbe
−ρ(a+bx+cy∗)
(1+e−ρ(a+bx+cy∗))
2 and f ′′(x) =
(1−ε)ρ2b2e−ρ(a+bx+cy∗)(e−ρ(a+bx+cy∗)−1)
(1+e−ρ(a+bx+cy∗))
3 , respectively. By direct calculation, we have
that a) at most two local extrema exist in the interval (0, 1) and b) an inflection
point exists in (0, 1) if and only if cy
∗+a
−b ∈ (0, 1). This point, when exists, is
unique. We can now distinguish two cases:
I Let b > 0, then f is increasing in the interval [0, 1]. If cy∗ + a > 0 or
cy∗+a < −b, f ′′ doesn't change its sign in (0, 1). Therefore the uniqueness
of the fixed point follows. By contrast, if cy∗ + a ∈ (−b, 0), considering
the signs of the second order derivative, then one or three fixed points
generally exist. The ones with an odd index are stable, the one with an
even index, if it exists, is unstable.
II Suppose otherwise that b < 0. According to different configurations of the
parameters, f may be monotone, unimodal or bimodal. If cy∗ + a < 0
or cy∗ + a > −b, f ′′ doesn't change its sign in (0, 1). By contrast, if
cy∗ + a ∈ (0,−b) we have that f ′′(0) = (1−ε)ρ
2b2e−ρ(a+cy
∗)(e−ρ(a+cy
∗)−1)
(1+e−ρ(a+cy∗))
3 < 0
and f ′′(1) =
(1−ε)ρ2b2e−ρ(a+cy∗+b)(e−ρ(a+cy∗+b)−1)
(1+e−ρ(a+b+cy∗))
3 > 0. Considering the value
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of f at 0 and 1, in both cases a unique (stable or unstable) fixed point
exists.
As outlined in Proposition 2, if the influence from the southerners adopting the
cognitive narrative is comparatively disadvantageous for northerners adopting the
emotive narrative, i.e. c < 0, more interesting dynamics may arise. Indeed, a
negative c may lead to a destabilisation of the dynamics as well as to the emergence
of multistability in the North. The bifurcation diagram in Fig. 5 shows the changes
in the ω-limit set for the variable x as c varies. Even if in both groups the favoured
narrative is widespread, i.e. x∗ and y∗ are stable and are very close to 1, the negative
impact c from narrative divergence with the South can destabilise the North. In
particular, we note that in some intervals the x-dynamics is chaotic. Moreover, for
lower values of c the dynamics of x reaches lower values as well, being captured
by a stable fixed point which is very close to 0. In this case, southern influence
dramatically changes the dynamics in the North.
Moreover, starting from a case in which both groups are isolated and whose dy-
namics converge toward fixed points x∗ and y∗, a negative influence from the South c
may be the engine of a bistable regime. In this case, shown in Fig. 6, there exist two
locally stable fixed points whose basins of attraction are separated by an unstable
fixed point. Convergence towards either a lower or a higher fixed point depends on
the value of x at the moment when the North starts being subject to the influence
from the South. If the interaction with the South starts when the level of x is suffi-
ciently high, then its long term dynamics will not change and it will converge to the
higher fixed point. However, if this is not the case and x is sufficiently low when the
interaction begins, x will converge to a stationary state with a value very close to 0.
In other terms, if the share of northerners adopting their favourite, emotive narrative
is high, a negative feedback from the interaction with the cognitive southerners will
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FIG. 5: Bifurcation diagram with
respect to c. Parameter values:
a = 33, b = −30, α = 10, β = 4,
γ = 0, ε = 0.47, ρ = 1, c varies in the
interval (−40, 10).
FIG. 6: Asymptotic x-dynamics (for
y = y∗ ' 1). The unstable
equilibrium that separates the basins
of attraction is x ' 0.3129775350.
Parameter values: a = 10, b = 55,
c = −18, α = 10, β = 30, γ = 0,
ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
be absorbed. By contrast, if the population of the North is still undecided between
the emotive and the cognitive narrative, convergence to the first may be reversed so
that the northerners will end up adopting a cognitive narrative under the influence
of the southerners.
Until now we analysed the effect of southern influence on the North when the
dynamics of the two groups converges toward the fixed points x∗ and y∗. In Fig.
7 we show the effect of the southern influence when the dynamics in the South
is characterised by a stable 2-period cycle, whereas the dynamics in the North is
attracted by a fixed point x∗ close to 1. In this case, we note that for c close to, but
different from 0 (negative in Fig. 7), the 2-period cycle of the y-dynamics carries
over to the dynamics of x, which oscillates between two values. Moreover, since the
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dynamics of y converges toward a 2-period cycle, the asymptotic dynamics of x is
described by the map:
x′ = εx+
1− ε
1 + e−ρ(a+bx+cyi)
(10)
with yi alternating between the two values of the cycle. In Fig. 8 below we show
this occurrence, which generates 2-period cycles in the x-dynamics. In particular,
the figure shows in blue and in black the graphs from map (10) with yi equal to
the values of the cycle obtained in the dynamics of y : y1 ' 0.333, y2 ' 0.668,
respectively.
FIG. 7: Bifurcation diagram with
respect to c. Parameter values:
a = 30, b = −23, α = 10, β = −20,
γ = 0, ε = 0.47, ρ = 1, c varies in the
interval (−30, 10).
FIG. 8: Formation of a 2-period cycle
in the x-dynamics. Parameter values:
a = 30, b = −23, c = −10, α = 10,
β = −20, γ = 0, ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
It is also relevant to note that for lower values of c, the 2-period cycle in the
y-dynamics can create cyclical dynamics in x of longer period, as shown in Fig. 9.
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In general, in a scenario characterised by southerners cyclically changing their nar-
rative, inter-group externalities in the North make the payoff of northerners subject
to the whims of the South. The openness of northerners towards the South drives
them to inherit and possibly amplify the number of oscillations and/or their ampli-
tude. Indeed, negative within-group externalities exacerbates the oscillations as they
may push the x-dynamics towards a higher or a lower fixed point, alternately. The
bifurcation diagram in Fig. 10 shows this mechanism, by which chaotic dynamics of
y transfers to that of x. We note that the width of the oscillations of x may vary
depending on the values of c.
FIG. 9: Mechanism for the formation
of a 4-period cycle in the x-dynamics.
Parameter values: a = 30, b = −23,
c = −15, α = 10, β = −20, γ = 0,
ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
FIG. 10: Bifurcation diagram with
respect to c. Parameter values:
a = 0.3, b = 1, c = −10, α = 30,
β = −40, γ = 0, ε = 0.47, ρ = 1, c
varies in the interval (−15, 10).
The analysis we conducted so far in case of an univocal influence for the North
holds symmetrically for the South, with γ leading to either self-enforcing or desta-
bilising dynamics in y. As the two groups are designed symmetrically, all results
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holding for one also hold for the other if the parameters are opportunely inverted.
VI. BIUNIVOCAL INFLUENCE
We now investigate some crucial instances of biunivocal influence between the
North and the South. Indeed, this case is much more complex than the univocal one
and a complete investigation of the map is beyond the scope of this work. As we did
in the previous section, we study the effect of inter-group externalities starting from
a situation in which the two groups are isolated, i.e. their dynamics are decoupled.
We further assume that the two groups have the same values for all parameters, so
that a = α, b = β, c = γ. This is done in order to focus on the effects of interaction
rather than on the asymmetrical properties of the groups. From this assumption, it
follows that the map T is symmetric, so that exchanging variables x and y leaves
the system unaffected. Equivalently, T ◦ R = R ◦ T , where R : (x, y) → (y, x) is
the reflection with respect to the diagonal ∆ = {(x, y) : x = y} . We note that ∆ is
an invariant manifold, that is T (∆) ⊆ ∆. This implies that starting from the same
initial conditions of x and y, the dynamics will lie on ∆ for any iteration of the map.
In this last case, the dynamics is governed by the restriction T∆ of the map T on ∆,
that is:
T∆ : x
′ = f (x) = εx+ (1− ε) 1
1 + e−ρ[(b+c)x+a]
(11)
We remark that the results of section IV (concerning isolated groups) can be
adapted to be valid also for the biunivocal influence case if we substitute parameter
b with the parameter b+ c. A relevant matter to investigate in bidimensional models
characterised by symmetry with respect to the diagonal is whether the attractors of
T∆ are also attractors for the bidimensional map (see [2] for a detailed analysis of a
symmetrical map generated by a duopoly model), that is for the trajectories in which
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the initial values of x and y differ. If synchronisation is reached, it means that the
favoured narrative dynamics in the two groups does not show significant differences
(even if this state may require a very long transient). From an analytical point of
view, this information can be derived in two different ways. On the one hand, it can
be derived by studying the transverse eigenvalues, in case n-period cycles exist on
the diagonal. On the other hand, if a chaotic attractor lies on the diagonal, it proves
particularly helpful to study the average Lyapunov transverse exponent in order to
understand whether synchronisation is reached. More precisely, starting from the
Jacobian matrix evaluated at a generic point on the diagonal:
J∆ (x, x) =
 J1 (x) J2 (x)
J2 (x) J1 (x)
 , (12)
where:
J1 (x) = ε+
(1− ε)ρbe−ρ((b+c)x+a)
[1 + e−ρ((b+c)x+a)]2
,
and
J2 (x) =
(1− ε)ρce−ρ((b+c)x+a)
[1 + e−ρ((b+c)x+a)]2
,
we may derive its eigenvalues. By virtue of the symmetry of J∆ (x, x), the eigen-
values are real and given by:
λ‖ = J1 (x) + J2 (x) =
(e−2ρ((b+c)x+a) + 1)ε+ (2ε+ (1− ε)ρ(b+ c))e−ρ((b+c)x+a)
[1 + e−ρ((b+c)x+a)]2
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with eigenvector r‖ = (1, 1), and
λ⊥ = J1 (x)− J2 (x) = (e
−2ρ((b+c)x+a) + 1)ε+ (2ε+ (1− ε)ρ(b− c))e−ρ((b+c)x+a)
[1 + e−ρ((b+c)x+a)]2
with eigenvector r⊥ = (1,−1). When a k-cycle {(x1, x1) , (x2, x2) , ..., (xk, xk)} on
∆ exists, the corresponding eigenvalues are:
λ
(k)
‖ =
k∏
i=1
(J1 (xi) + J2 (xi)) =
k∏
i=1
(e−2ρ((b+c)xi+a) + 1)ε+ (2ε+ (1− ε)ρ(b+ c))e−ρ((b+c)xi+a)
[1 + e−ρ((b+c)xi+a)]2
,
λ
(k)
⊥ =
k∏
i=1
(J1 (xi)− J2 (xi)) =
k∏
i=1
(e−2ρ((b+c)xi+a) + 1)ε+ (2ε+ (1− ε)ρ(b− c))e−ρ((b+c)xi+a)
[1 + e−ρ((b+c)xi+a)]2
.
The eigenvalue λ
(k)
‖ defines the stability properties of the map restricted to the
diagonal ∆, whereas λ
(k)
⊥ , called transverse eigenvalue, allows to verify whether such
cycle attracts, at least locally, the points lying outside the diagonal. This information
is obtained by studying the module of the transverse eigenvalue.
In general, an asymptotically stable attractor A for T∆ is an asymptotically sta-
ble attractor also for the map T if and only if all trajectories belonging to A are
transversely attracting. In order to address this issue we introduce the transverse
Lyapunov exponent :
L⊥ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
ln |λ⊥ (xn) |,
where x0 ∈ A and {xn} is a trajectory generated by the map T∆. When a chaotic
attractor C exists, varying initial conditions, a sequence of Lyapunov exponents is
obtained:
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Lmin⊥ ≤ ... ≤ Lnat⊥ ≤ ... ≤ Lmax⊥ ,
where Lnat⊥ is associated to a typical trajectory taken in the chaotic attractor
C, Lmin⊥ and L
max
⊥ are the extrema of the spectrum [see 5]. Different cases can be
classified: 1) if Lmax⊥ < 0, then C is asymptotically stable in the Lyapunov sense; 2)
if Lnat⊥ < 0 and L
max
⊥ > 0, then C is no longer stable in the Lyapunov sense, but it
still attracts a large set of trajectories starting outside the diagonal. In this case,
the basin of attraction has positive Lebesgue measure and C is said to be a Milnor
attractor; 3) if Lnat⊥ > 0, then the set C loses its stability and becomes a chaotic
saddle: according to global properties of the map, trajectories generated by initial
conditions outside the diagonal and close to C can be either drawn by an attractor
that envelops the saddle or captured by other attractors. As concerns the first two
cases presented, we recall that an invariant set K is Lyapunov stable provided that
for any neighbourhood U of K there exists another neighbourhood V of K such that
any forward orbit of the map starting at V never quits U .
In case we consider two isolated groups, i.e. c = γ = 0, which show stable
dynamics, and then assume the two groups start influencing each other with positive
inter-group externalities for both, we observe that the result of the interaction is to
push the fixed point (x∗, y∗) closer to the corner (1, 1). In general, in case of two
stable isolated groups, an increase in inter-groups externalities tends to promote the
favoured narrative in both groups, as they are now reinforced by the presence of the
favoured narrative in the other group, representing a symbiotic relationship between
the two groups and the two narratives, each benefiting from a specialisation effect. In
other terms, the two groups might find their favoured narrative to be complementary
to the other one.
27
FIG. 11: A Milnor attractor exists on
the diagonal. Its basin of attraction
is depicted in light grey. Parameter
values: a = 34, b = −30.5,
c = −7.474652, ε = 0.469, ρ = 1.2.
FIG. 12: Transverse Lyapunov
exponent for c ∈ (−7.48,−7.46). The
other parameters are unchanged with
respect to Fig. 11.
By contrast, in Fig. 11 we show how a decrease in inter-group externalities c
affects the x-dynamics. After a sequence of period-doubling bifurcations, simulations
suggest that a chaotic attractor exists on the diagonal for c = −7.474652. By further
analysing this scenario, we note that the average Lyapunov transverse exponent
Lnat⊥ is very close to 0 (as illustrated in Fig. 12), which suggests that some cycles
contained in the attractor are associated to eigenvalues that are greater than 1 in
module. Indeed, by looking at Fig. 13, where we plot the distance between the values
of x and y versus time starting from the initial condition (0.82, 0.83), we observe how
such value tends to 0.
However, even if this difference goes to 0, it occurs after a very long time (more
than 3000 iterations) and several windows exist in which dynamics are not syn-
chronised. This phenomenon is called on-off intermittency and here describes a
circumstance in which all individuals have a comparative advantage in interacting
with members from the other group adopting the same narrative whereas narratives
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FIG. 13: Onoff intermittency:
synchronisation occurs after a very
long transient. The values of the
parameters are equal to the ones in
Fig. 11.
FIG. 14: Coexistence of three
attractors: a two period cycle along
the diagonal, and two fixed points.
Different colours identify different
basins of attraction. Parameter
values: a = 34, b = −30.5, c = −45,
ε = 0.469, ρ = 1.2.
show an elitist dynamics (a negative within-group externality) within the group. In
other words, every individual would like to mimic what individuals from the other
group are doing, but also not to do what their co-members are doing. Intuitively,
these two forces drive the individuals towards opposite directions. Some individuals
might be among the few to capture all the benefits of coordinating with the other
group on their narrative, while also benefiting from the elitist feature of the narra-
tives. However, as soon as the narrative they carry diffuses within their group, the
corresponding payoff is undermined and some might decide to revert back to the
favoured narrative. These two opposite forces make individuals particularly respon-
sive to noise, so that it may drive the dynamics away from the attractor, although
the latter is eventually reached by the system.
For values of c lower than the one we set in Fig. 13 we note that the dynamics
on the diagonal tends to become regular, although multistability regimes may arise.
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FIG. 15: Transverse Lyapunov
exponent for c ∈ (−7.42,−7.30).
Other parameter values: a = 34,
b = −30.7, ε = 0.45, ρ = 1.2.
FIG. 16: Coexistence of an attractor
on the diagonal and a 4-period cycle
outside of it. Parameter values:
a = 34, b = −30.7, c = −7.3,
ε = 0.45, ρ = 1.2.
This is shown in Fig. 14, where two additional attractors, beyond the 2-period cycle
along the diagonal, exist and are symmetrical with respect to the diagonal. Such
attractors are reached by the system if the difference between x and y is sufficiently
low, i.e. if the initial condition lies either in the yellow or in the dark grey zone
of Fig. 14. In this case, one of the narratives is adopted by almost all individuals,
whereas the other one nearly disappears. We remark that different phenomena may
be observed by considering varying levels of c starting from a different parameter
specification. Indeed, considering the parameter values a = 34, b = −30.7, ε = 0.45,
ρ = 1.2, the study of the Lyapunov exponent presents phases in which it is positive, as
shown in Fig. 15. In this case no attractor exists on the diagonal and the trajectories
are attracted by a 4-period cycle outside the diagonal, illustrated in Fig. 17.
We now analyse the case in which the two groups show chaotic dynamics when
isolated. This case is shown in Fig. 18, where we consider the symmetrical case
in which the two groups have the same parameters. An increase in the intensity of
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FIG. 17: A 4-period cycle outside the diagonal. Parameter values: a = 34,
b = −30.7, c = −7.36, ε = 0.45, ρ = 1.2.
the interrelation between the two groups leads to a chaotic attractor located in the
north-east region of the state plane (see Fig. 19). This is due to the self-reinforcing
mechanism that may arise if the elitist dynamics described by negative values of b
and β is more than offset by positive values of c and γ. In other terms, if the emotive
narrative in the North yields increasing payoffs as the number of southerners adopting
the cognitive narrative increases and vice versa, the shares x and y of individuals
adopting the favoured narratives will be higher. As c increases further, the system
may stabilise and a fixed point very close to (1, 1) becomes the global attractor of
the system.
In addition, we remark that by slightly changing the parameter specification, an
increase in c in this stabilisation process might lead to the identification of intervals
characterised by low-period cyclic attractors. For instance, the graph in Fig. 20
refers to the parameters values a = 30, b = −40, c = 4, ε = 0.48, ρ = 1.3, and shows
a very long transient before this attractor is definitely captured by 3-period cycles,
hence leading to very simple dynamics in the long term trajectory. The behaviour
of the transient in this process is depicted in Fig. 21. In order to understand such
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FIG. 18: Decoupled dynamics: the
grey region denotes the basin of
attraction of the unique (chaotic)
attractor of the system. Parameter
values: a = α = 30, b = β = −40,
c = γ = 0, ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
FIG. 19: Evolution of the attractor
as c increases. Parameter values:
a = α = 30, b = β = −40, c = γ = 5,
ε = 0.47, ρ = 1.
behaviour, we note that by virtue of the Li-Yorke theorem [14] we know that a
chaotic repeller lies on the diagonal and an infinite number of cycles exists. Given
the behaviour of the time series, many (potentially infinite) of these cycles are also
transversally unstable.
VII. DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this work, we presented how narrative dynamics in two social groups may be
affected by inter-group externalities, in addition to within-group ones. Indeed, even
starting from a case in which both groups have a single fixed point which is an at-
tractor, we showed how chaotic dynamics may arise in at least one of the groups.
In particular, we differentiated between the univocal case, in which only one of the
groups is open to influence from the other, and the biunivocal case, in which the in-
fluence is reciprocal. On the one hand, we found that influence from another group
32
FIG. 20: A 3-period cycle along the
diagonal is the unique attractor of
the system. Parameter values:
a = 30,b = −40, c = 4, ε = 0.48,
ρ = 1.3.
FIG. 21: The transient shows an
irregular behaviour even if the
trajectories are attracted by a low
period cycle. This is due to the
presence of a chaotic repeller.
may be strong enough to shift the dynamics in the open group away from its original
attractor in which almost every individual adopts the favoured narrative toward a
new fixed point in which almost nobody does so. In addition, chaotic dynamics in
an isolated group may carry over to the other group if it is open to its influence.
Moreover, the instability may be amplified in the open group, with larger-period
dynamics. In both cases, inter-group influence is shown to be a potentially strong
destabilising force. On the other hand, we analysed the case in which the influence
is reciprocal and symmetrical. Firstly, we considered stable dynamics in the isolated
groups and a positive reciprocal influence, so that individuals adopting the favoured
narratives in both groups are advantaged from the interaction. A self-reinforcing
mechanism then attracts the fixed point toward the north-east corner of the map.
Secondly, although we kept considering stable isolated dynamics, we considered neg-
ative inter-group influence. In this case, the parameters allow us to identify several
different scenarios, including a chaotic attractor, multistability and cycles outside the
diagonals. Finally, we take into account the possibility that the isolated dynamics is
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chaotic in both groups and analyse the effect of a reciprocal, positive influence. We
observe that also in this case the map presents a variety of scenarios, with the most
relevant one being the possibility of inter-group interaction acting as a stabilisation
process, leading the system from a chaotic attractor to a stable one. However, even if
we analysed and presented some of the most salient results of inter-group interaction
and its effects on narrative dynamics, we left some important regions of the map
unexplored from which some very relevant considerations may be drawn. Further
investigation of the dynamics might uncover such aspects or might focus on study-
ing the role of numerosity and fragmentation of groups in their interaction. Indeed,
although this model illustrates what are the main mechanics, it could be a scaffold
toward understanding more intricate interactions between many social groups, whose
internal dynamics are possibly much different from each other.
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